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Leidschrift, jaargang 27, nummer 1, april 2012 
The sixteenth century was ‘the age of dissimulation’ as courtiers and 
officials, religious dissidents and Jews, authors and even rulers 
dissimulated.1 I will argue that during this period domestic court intrigue, 
foreign policymaking and international espionage were intertwined. David 
Passi was a Jewish adviser and favourite of Sultan Murad III (r. 1574-1595) 
of the Ottoman Empire.2 Nevertheless, Passi was spying for Spain, Venice, 
England and the Ottoman Empire at the same time. European states had a 
stake in Passi’s high-profile disgrace case (1591) because he was advising on 
the fleet preparations for a joint Anglo-Ottoman naval offensive against 
Spain. The Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Paşa (in office 1580; 1589-1591, 1593-
1595) was an active proponent of this war. He saw the Jewish favourite, 
who belonged to a rival faction, as a threat to his foreign policy interests. 
The grand vizier’s reports to the sultan that Passi was a spy and that 
Muslims should not befriend or trust Jews were to no avail. Eventually, 
Koca Sinan Paşa managed to get David Passi banished from the court by 
accusing him of co-authoring a libellous letter.  
Politics has been considered a game of dissimulation and 
nonchalance at least since the days of Tacitus. Aristocrats, grand viziers, 
secretaries of state, ambassadors, courtiers and semi-official court members 
such as David Passi secretly carried out speculative and treacherous 
                                                     
* Dedicated to Zeynep Çelik, Suraiya Faroqhi and Huricihan İslamoğlu – three 
teachers who have been a constant source of inspiration and support in the past 
decade. I am grateful to everyone who generously offered feedback. Maaike van 
Berkel, Jeroen Duindam, Liesbeth Geevers, Jos Gommans, Boris James, Antonis 
Hadjikyriacou, Stuart Parkinson, Peter Rietbergen and Aleksandar Sopov offered 
great suggestions and constructive criticism. Barend Noordam kindly assisted with 
German. The editors of Leidschrift, especially Brigitte van de Pas, have done brilliant 
work on the article. 
1  J. Martin, ‘Inventing Sincerity, Refashioning Prudence: The Discovery of the 
Individual in Renaissance’, The American Historical Review 102 (1997) 1309-1342; P. 
Zagorin, Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution and Conformity in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge, MA 1990) 1-14. 
2 B. Arbel, ‘David Passi’ in: N. A. Stillman ed., Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World 





undertakings. These endeavours concerned diplomacy, warfare, succession 
problems, peace negotiations, aggrandizement of factions and illegitimate 
commercial profits. Furthermore, they plotted at court and across courts. 
For they knew that if their acts and interests became publicly known, they 
would be disgraced. The repercussions of disgrace could include dismissal, 
investigation, confiscation, exile and execution. 3  Conspiracy was ever-
present during the crises of the Reformation and the Wars of Religion. 
Explanation of conspiracies through human agency instead of divine 
providence made sure there was public support for the punishments meted 
out to plotters.4 Thus, the art of dissimulation was the most valuable asset 
the political elites had.  
In the last thirty years the scholarship on the factional division of 
mercantile and diplomatic interests among the grand viziers and their rivals 
has increased considerably. Grand viziers hid their commercial and political 
motivations in a thick discourse of religiosity and servitude to the sultan. 
Their factions profited from trade with different nations. Conclusion of 
peace treaties was another source of financial gain for grand viziers, who 
received cash (going up to 10.000 ducats) and other costly gifts.5 I will argue 
that Koca Sinan’s attempts to banish David Passi and fight the Spanish, and 
his rivals’ support for peace with Spain, elucidate the divided loyalty and 
personal engagement of grand viziers. 
I will contextualize David Passi’s disgrace not just as a domestic libel 
plot, but also as an exemplary of the precarious position Jewish diplomats 
had. David Passi belonged to a network of Jewish and New Christian 
                                                     
3 Zagorin, Ways of Lying, 7-14.  
4  B. Coward and J. Swann, ‘Introduction’ in: B. Coward and J. Swann ed., 
Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in Early Modern Europe: From the Waldensians to the 
French Revolution (Aldershot 2004) 1-12. 
5 İ. M. Kunt, ‘Derviş Mehmed Paşa, Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman 
Political-Economic theory and Practice’, Turcica 9 (1977) 197-214; C. Kafadar, ‘A 
Death in Venice: Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the Serenissima’, Journal 
of Turkish Studies 10 (1986) 191-218; A. Salzmann, ‘An Ancién Regime Revisited: 
“Privatization” and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire’, 
Politics and Society 21 (1993) 393-423; G. Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration 
(Oxford 2010). For the earlier period Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont’s primary 
source publications shed light on these activities: J. L. Bacqué-Grammont, ‘Autour 
d’une correspondance entre Charles-Quint et İbrâhîm Paşa’, Turcica 15 (1983) 231-
246; Idem, ‘Neuf Lettres de Ferhâd Paşa (1515-1521)’, Journal of Ottoman Studies 10 
(1990) 69-97. 




(disparagingly referred as marranos, literally ‘pigs’) 6  diplomats, physicians, 
financiers and spies that connected courts across Europe in the late 
sixteenth century. Being alien was the core identity of these prominent 
actors. Identities of aliens, however, were not simple enough to be defined 
solely in relation to their religious beliefs and practices, national background 
and the rulers whose services they entered. Identities and loyalties of aliens 
were fluid, contingent and relational. They do not fulfil modern 
expectations of consistency and integrity; nor do they fit neatly into our 
religious, ethnic and national categories.7 David Passi’s disgrace shows how 
things went wrong when the multiple loyalties and identities of aliens 
crashed.  
I will couple Ottoman and European sources, making visible the 
discrepancy between the domestic discourse and the international interests 
of the Imperial Council members. Through Koca Sinan Paşa’s précis 
reports (telhis) to Murad III8 and the chronicle of Selanikî Mustafa Efendi,9 
one learns how the grand vizier convinced the sultan that Passi and the 
Governor-General of Rumelia, Saatçi Hasan Paşa, co-authored a libellous 
letter. Yet, Ottoman chronicles are silent about the entrepreneurial 
initiatives, diplomatic and commercial choices of the Imperial Council 
members. This silence can be explained through the conventions of the 
genre rather than the ignorance of chroniclers about these issues. Selanikî 
Mustafa Efendi, a mid-level court bureaucrat, would leave them out not to 
accuse the dignitaries openly. Instead he used the topoi of criticism that were 
already established such as corruption, bribe taking and aggrandizement. 
                                                     
6 Zagorin, Ways of Lying, 13. 
7 S. Subrahmanyam, Three Ways to be Alien: Travails and encounters in the Early Modern 
World (Lebanon, NH 2011), 1-14; E. R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, 
Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore, MD 2006) 103-
105; B. Arbel, Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern 
Mediterranean (Leiden 1995) 145-168; E. V. Campos, ‘Jews, Spaniards, and 
Portingales: Ambiguous Identities of Portuguese Marranos in Elizabethan England’, 
English Literary History 69 (2002) 599-616; J. Martin, ‘The Discovery of the 
Individual in Renaissance’, 1321-1335; L. Jardine, Reading Shakespeare Historically 
(London 1996) 97-103. 
8 H. Sahillioğlu ed., Koca Sinan Paşa'nın Telhisleri [The Précis Reports of Koca Sinan 
Paşa] (Istanbul 2004). 
9  Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selânikî: 971-1008/1563-1600 [The History of 





The Venetian diplomatic dispatches H. F. Brown edited in Calendar of 
State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice shed light on the 
Imperial Council members’ diplomatic leanings and information-gathering 
methods.10 For instance, that Koca Sinan Paşa belongs to the ‘anti-Spanish 
party’,11 that ‘The Grand Vizir [sic] is well disposed towards the Republic’12 
or how Koca Sinan gathers information from renegades.13 What is silenced 
or absent in Ottoman chronicles and archival records often is present in 
diplomatic correspondence.14 They are invaluable for our understanding of 
factional politics; we learn which party supported which foreign policy, and 
how they tried to gain the upper hand with court intrigues. 15  Yet, one 
should caution for the inclusion of unverified gossip, exaggeration and 
distortion of events due to what their authors had at stake.  
The disgrace of David Passi and his relationships with Murad III and 
Koca Sinan Paşa have been the subject of two articles.16 Works on the 
Mediterranean Jewish history also discuss his case. 17  Suraiya Faroqhi 
                                                     
10 Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 8: 
1581-1591. H. F. Brown ed. (London 1894); Calendar of State Papers Relating to English 
Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 9: 1592-1603. H. F. Brown ed. (London 1897). 
On H. F. Brown’s selection of documents, see E. Armstrong, ‘Venetian Despatches 
on the Armada and Its Results’, English Historical Review 12 (1897) 659-678: 659. 
11 ‘Venice: December 1591’, Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 564-570. 
12 ‘Venice: January 1591’, Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 512-521. 
13 ‘Venice: March 1591’, Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 526-536; ‘Venice: January 
1591’, Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 512-521. 
14 For instance compare Selaniki’s account of the dismissal of Siyavuş Paşa and the 
appointment of Osman Paşa, ‘Elizabeth: September 1584, 1-10’, Calendar of State 
Papers Foreign, Elizabeth, Volume 19: August 1584-August 1585 (1916), 43-58; 
Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki, 144-146. 
15 M. P. Pedani and E. Dursteler use these sources to reconstruct the relationships 
between Ottoman dignitaries and Venetians. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople; M. 
P. Pedani, ‘Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy’, Turcica 32 (2000) 9-32. 
16 S. Faroqhi, ‘Ein Günstling des Osmanischen Sultans Murad III: David Passi’, Der 
Islam 47 (1971) 290-297; P. Fodor, ‘An anti-Semite Grand Vizier? The crisis in 
Ottoman-Jewish Relations in 1589-91 and its Consequences’ in: Idem ed., In Quest 
of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman 
Empire (Istanbul 2000) 191-206. 
17 B. Arbel, Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean 
(Leiden 1995) 164-168; S. W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews XVIII 
(New York, NY 1983) 134-141; C. Roth, The Duke of Naxos of the House of Nasi 
(Philadelphia, PA 1948) 204-212; E. Kohen, History of the Turkish Jews and Sephardim: 




showed that David Passi’s fall had to do with ‘the intermediate realm, in 
which diplomacy and espionage are often barely distinguishable’, using both 
Ottoman and European sources for the first time. Pal Fodor took a 
different direction and argued that Koca Sinan opposed David Passi out of 
anti-Jewish feelings that became common during Murad III’s reign. Neither 
Faroqhi nor Fodor show how a libel plot was ultimately the cause of Passi’s 
disgrace. I will argue that a conflict of domestic and diplomatic interests, 
specifically the Anglo-Ottoman League, brought David Passi into disgrace, 
rather than the anti-Jewish sentiments of Koca Sinan. Furthermore, I argue 
that Passi was not the only one who undertook covert illegitimate activities 
at court. The grand vizier’s libel accusation, analyzed in the second part of 
the paper, may have been a court intrigue to remove his rival. 
 
 
The balance of power in the late sixteenth century Mediterranean 
 
Religious and national solidarity seems subordinate to pragmatic 
considerations in late sixteenth century trade and diplomacy. Neither a 
Christian-Muslim frontier divided the Mediterranean,18 nor was Europe split 
up into Catholic and Protestant parts. Trade between Spain and England 
continued at the height of their conflict.19 While the wars of religion were 
going on, traditional formulations of Christian unity against the Muslims 
became obsolete. Commercial and diplomatic relations between the 
Protestant countries and the Ottomans further weakened the ‘common 
corps of Christendom’ argument. Yet, politicians continued to reproduce 
                                                                                                                       
memories of a past golden age (Lanham, MD 2007) 99-109; I. Burdelez, ‘The Role of 
Ragusan Jews in the History of Mediterranean Countries’ in: A. M. Ginio ed., Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims in the Mediterranean World After 1492 (London 1992) 190-197. 
18 Still a division between the Muslims and Christians in the Mediterranean persists, 
see C. B. Johnson, ‘The Algerian Economy and Cervantes’ First Work of Narrative 
Fiction’ in: G. Piterberg, T. R. Ruiz and G. Symcox ed., Braudel Revisited: The 
Mediterranean World: 1600-1800 (Toronto 2010) 207-228. 
19 P. Croft, ‘Trading with the Enemy, 1585-1604’, The Historical Journal 32 (1989) 
281-302; M. J. Rodriguez-Salgado, ‘Paz ruidosa, guerra sorda: las relaciones de 
Felipe II e Inglaterra’ [Noisy peace, silent war: the relations of England and Philip 
II] in: L. Ribot Garcia ed., La monarquía de Felipe II a debate [The monarchy of Philip 
II on debate] (Madrid 2000) 63-119; G. Parker, ‘The Place of Tudor England in the 
Messianic Vision of Philip II of Spain: The Prothero Lecture’, Transactions of the 





conventional religious discourse. For instance, the Secretary of State Sir 
Francis Walsingham (in office 1573-1590) maintained a discourse of 
‘Christian unity against the Turk’, while he was in practice the mastermind 
behind the Anglo-Ottoman alliance for which David Passi posed a threat.20  
The Anglo-Ottoman rapprochement was based on calculations of the 
balance of power in Europe. The crusading King of Portugal Dom 
Sebastiao (r. 1557-1578) died without an heir on August 4, 1578 at the battle 
of al-Qasr al-Kabir (Portuguese Alcazarquivir) in Morocco. Philip II of Spain 
(r. 1556-1598) annexed Portugal in 1580 because he was the heir 
presumptive through his mother’s line. As a result, the Moroccans began 
pursuing a policy of neutrality towards Spain. 21  Furthermore, it was 
commonly feared that Philip II would soon add France and England to his 
dominions. Because Elizabeth I of England (r. 1558-1603) did not marry 
any of her suitors, she was unlikely to produce an heir, while the succession 
in France turned bloody after the death of Henry III in 1589.  
In response to the King of Spain’s aggrandizement, the Ottoman 
sultan, the Queen of England, Henry IV of France (r. 1589-1610) and a 
pretender to the Portuguese throne, the Prior of Crato, Don Antonio (Dom 
António in Portuguese), drew closer. 22  The Venetians remained neutral 
while harbouring two fears: firstly, that Philip II had his eye on the 
                                                     
20 F. L. Baumer, ‘England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom’, The 
American Historical Review 50 (1944) 26-48: 39-40. The ideal of Christian unity 
informed many publications in this period. For instance, Hakluyt took out a 
sentence about the joint attack because it would show the Anglo-Ottoman 
conspiracy against Spain. See Faroqhi, ‘Ein Günstling’, 295. This discourse 
continued to inform publications about the Ottoman Empire in the next century, 
for instance, see the anonymous The Intrigues of the French King at Constantinople to 
embroil Christendom (London 1689). 
21  G. Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford 2010) 152-153; D. Yahya, 
Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy (Essex 
1981) 88-114. 
22 B. Givens, ‘Sebastianism in Theory and Practice in Early Modern Portugal’ in: G. 
Piterberg, T. R. Ruiz and G. Symcox ed., Braudel Revisited: The Mediterranean World: 
1600-1800 (Toronto 2010) 127-150: 132-134; D. M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: 
A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (Liverpool 1954) 146-175; A. N. Kurat, Türk-İngiliz 
Münasebetlerinin Başlangıcı ve Gelişmesi (1553-1610) [The Beginning and Development 
of Anglo-Turkish Relations] (Ankara 1953) 118-175.  




Republic’s possessions and secondly, that the Ottomans would attack Crete 
if they did not attack Spain with their new fleet.23  
While Philip II’s preparations for the ‘enterprise of England’ 
continued in the mid-1580s, the English had a back-up plan to counter the 
Spanish Armada. They entered into a league with the Ottomans against 
Spain, their mutual enemy, in order to attack Spain from both sides: the 
Ottoman navy in the Mediterranean and the English in the Atlantic. 24 The 
King of Spain was not the only foe the Ottomans and the English shared. 
The ‘Elizabethan-Ottoman Conspiracy’ from the 1580s also had the aim of 
capturing Malta, which was another fervent member of the Catholic 
League.25 It can be argued that the English wanted an alliance with the 
Ottomans for reasons other than survival. They were trying to solve many 
problems at once with a concerted attack from both sides: to establish Don 
Antonio on the Portuguese throne and the Huguenot King of Navarre on 
the French. Therefore, arguably, the English wanted to change the balance 
of power entirely to their liking, while their merchants were enjoying the 
profits of trade with the Ottomans.26 The Ottomans, however, had their 
hands tied at war against the Safavids of Iran, from 1578 to 1590. This war 
made it difficult for the Ottomans to realize an attack in the Mediterranean 
until the conclusion of peace with the Safavids in 1590.  
Power was pragmatically consolidated in dynastic empires, who 
conspired together; The Spanish and the Safavid empires forged alliances, 
while England and the Ottoman Empire did the same. When the news of 
the Ottoman peace negotiations with the Safavids reached Madrid in 
November 1586,27  Spain dispatched an agent to Istanbul to negotiate a 
                                                     
23 F. de Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early Modern Politics 
(Oxford 2007) 40-85; ‘Venice: February 1591’, Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 521-
526. 
24 E. Pears, ‘The Spanish Armada And The Ottoman Porte’, English Historical Review 
8 (1893) 439-466; E. Armstrong, ‘Venetian Despatches on the Armada and Its 
Results’, English Historical Review 12 (1897) 659-678; F. L. Baumer, ‘England, the 
Turk’, 33; A. P. Vella, An Elizabethan-Ottoman Conspiracy (Malta 1972) 69-70.  
25 Vella, An Elizabethan-Ottoman Conspiracy, 7-76. 
26 For the Spanish anxiety on the benefits of this trade see L. Jardine, ‘Gloriana 
Rules the Waves: Or, the Advantage of Being Excommunicated (And a Woman)’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 14 (2004) 209-222: 211-212; D. Jensen, ‘The 
Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy’, The Sixteenth Century 
Journal 16 (1985) 451-470: 467-486. 





truce, which would prevent a surprise Ottoman attack during the Spanish 
‘enterprise against England’. Grand Vizier Siyavuş Paşa accepted 10.000 
ducats from the Spanish agent through his adviser Moses Beneviste. 
However, the peace was not concluded because the Spanish did not 
concede to the Ottoman Sultan’s demand to include the Queen of England 
as his ally in the treatise. As a result, Philip II offered the Safavid Shah arms, 
‘either one thousand Spanish musketeers or two thousand Portuguese 
harquebusiers’, so that he would continue the war.28 Meanwhile, the English 
and the Ottomans were bolstering their alliance by setting the slaves of one 
another free. 29 
The early Anglo-Ottoman relations show that conventional ideas 
about Ottoman diplomacy, such as the pursuit of a unilateral foreign policy 
until the eighteenth century or that perpetual warfare in darü’l-harb (abode of 
war) had been the raison d’être of the Ottoman state, are not valid. The 
Ottomans and the English were both willing to enter into an alliance as 
equal partners to counter the Catholic League led by their mutual enemy 
Philip II. This rapprochement does not conform to the traditional view 
about Ottoman methods of alliance with the ‘infidels’, in which Ottomans 




                                                     
28 ‘Venice: July 1587’, Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 290-302; E. Naki, Şah Abbas 
Döneminde İspanya-İran İlişkileri (1587-1629) [Relations between Iran and Spain 
during the reign of Shah Abbas, 1587-1629] (MA Thesis, Ankara University, 2009) 
95-124; L. Gil, ‘Diplomatik Denge: İspanya, Osmanlı ve Safevî İmparatorlukları’ 
[Diplomatic Balance: Spanish, Ottoman and Safavid empires] in: P. Martin Asuero 
ed. İspanya-Türkiye: 16. yüzyıldan 21. yüzyıla rekabet ve dostluk [Spain-Turkey: Rivalry 
and Friendship from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century] (Istanbul 2006) 139-
155. 
29 ‘Venice: July 1587’, Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 290-302; ‘Venice: August 1588’, 
Calendar of State Papers, Vol. 8, 372-382. Likewise, Marlowe’s Jew, Barabas, set Turks 
free. R. Wilson, ‘Another Country: Marlowe and the Go-Between’ in: A. Höfele and 
W. von Koppenfels ed., Renaissance Go-Betweens: Cultural Exchange in Early Modern 
Europe (Berlin 2005) 177-199: 190-192. 
30  For a critical perspective on Ottoman diplomacy, see A. N. Yurdusev, ‘The 
Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy’ in: A. N. Yurdusev ed., Ottoman Diplomacy: 
Conventional or Unconventional? (Hampshire 2004) 5-35; D. Goffman, The Ottoman 
Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge 2004) 1-20. 




Jews and New Christians at courts 
 
Jews from Spain and Portugal, such as David Passi, were good candidates 
for spies because they had mercantile, financial, linguistic and diplomatic 
aptitude; furthermore they had connections all over Europe. The profusion 
of double agents in this period had something to do with spymasters such 
as Secretaries of State Thomas Wilson, Sir Francis Walsingham and Don 
Juan de Idiáquez. The Elizabethan statesmen found their spies among 
Catholics who fled the country. Spain employed as spies Protestants and 
Jews. 31  Jewish, Protestant and Catholic spies combined sincerity and 
pretence in the age of dissimulation. They had to leave their countries 
behind because they could not or chose not to dissimulate about their 
religious identity any more. Yet, in their adopted homelands, they worked 
for the very rulers who did not tolerate their presence back home.  
Courtly careers were also open to aliens in the sixteenth century. 
Some New Christians came to prominence at the Elizabethan court, such as 
the queen’s physician Roderigo Lopez. The New Christian network was 
tightly knit; when Lopez was charged with high treason in 1593, Solomon 
Abenaish (Alvaro Mendes), another Jewish adviser of Murad III, tried to 
intervene – albeit without success – through his London agent Judah 
Serfatim. 32  At the Spanish court in the early seventeenth century, New 
Christian financiers and merchants such as Manuel Cortizos and Juan 
Nuñez enjoyed the favour of the king and his favourite minister Don 
Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke of Olivares. Despite being the confidant 
of Olivares, Nuñez was charged with Jewish heresy in 1613, but he got away 
with a heavy fine.33  
Although it has been claimed Murad III harboured anti-Jewish 
sentiments, the sultan relied on Jewish physicians and advisers. 34 A 
                                                     
31 M. Leimon and G. Parker, ‘Treason and Plot in Elizabethan Diplomacy: The 
“Fame of Sir Edward Stafford” Reconsidered’, The English Historical Review 111 
(1996) 1134-1158: 1138-1139, 1148-1157; Zagorin, Ways of Lying, 1-14, 38-62; Arbel, 
Trading Nations, 77-168; Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 103-129; Burdelez, 
‘Ragusan Jews’, 190-197. 
32 Campos, ‘Jews, Spaniards, and Portingales’, 599-600, 603-607; Wilson, ‘Another 
Country’, 191-192; C. Roth, The Duke of Naxos of the House of Nasi (Philadephia 1948) 
211; Baron, A Social and Religious History, 140-142. 
33 Zagorin, Ways of Lying, 54. 





combination of intellectual capital of medicine, fluency in European 
languages and an intimate knowledge of contemporary European politics 
secured Jews entry into the orbit of politics at the Ottoman court.35 Most of 
these figures were of Portuguese or Spanish origin: newcomers into the 
Ottoman Jewry that expanded due to the expulsion of Jews from the 
Iberian peninsula during the sixteenth century. They brought capital they 
had accumulated elsewhere, made through banking in Europe, as in the case 
of Don Joseph Nasi or through mining privileges in India, as in the case of 
Solomon Abenaish. They used their capital to bid on lucrative tax farms in 
the Ottoman Empire. 36 
David Passi, a Jew of either Portuguese or Spanish origin, became the 
favourite agent, adviser and confidant of Sultan Murad III. Passi used to live 
in Ragusa (present day Dubrovnik), moving to the Venetian ghetto in 1572, 
where the Jewish merchants lived with their families. During this period, he 
was working as a double agent for Venice and Spain. In 1573, Guzmán de 
Silva, the Spanish ambassador in Venice, wrote that Passi ‘spoke Spanish 
and considered himself to be a native of Spain, yet he was dressed in a 
Greek manner.’ The ambassador added that Passi was very rich.37 His wife 
lived in Ferrara, his father in Thessaloniki, his uncle in Istanbul. He is said 
to be the nephew of a physician of Murad III, either Moses Hamon or his 
successor Joseph de Segura.38 His brother lived at the Polish court.39 On 17 
                                                     
35 Among the prominent Jewish figures at the court of Murad III, one can 
enumerate Kira Esther, the agent of the queen mother Nurbanu Sultan; Kira 
Esperanza, the agent of Murad III’s wife Safiye Sultan; the physician Solomon 
Nathan Ashkenazi, also called Alamanoğlu [son of the German]; physician Moses 
Beneviste known as ‘Hoca Musahibi’ (the boon companion of the [Imperial] Tutor); 
Alvaro Mendes known as Solomon Abenaish; imperial physicians Moses Hamon 
and Joseph de Segura; and David Passi. 
36 Baron, A Social and Religious History, 84-147; Roth, Duke of Naxos, 195-216; Wilson, 
‘Another Country’, 179-180; L. Jardine, ‘Alien Intelligence’, 97-103; U. Heyd, 
‘Moses Hamon, Chief Jewish Physician to Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent’, Oriens 
16 (1963) 152-170; Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 103-129. Their entry into 
Istanbul Jewry was not uncontested. See D. Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early 
Modern Europe, 87-89, 180-182. 
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August 1585, a Venetian letter mentioned him for the first time as the 
confidant of Murad III. There was the possibility of ‘the wealthy Jew, David 
Passi’ becoming the Duke of Naxos and the Archipelago, vacant since the 
death of Joseph Nasi in 1579.40 At the time, he was collaborating with the 
English about the Polish succession in addition to reporting to the sultan on 
the current state of Europe. 
 
 
The grand viziers’ visions for diplomacy and trade 
 
Koca Sinan Paşa and David Passi belonged to rival factions. When Koca 
Sinan was appointed grand vizier for the second time in 1589, David Passi 
had been the only favourite of Murad III who survived the Beylerbeyi 
Incident (1589). This incident, a cavalry uprising that took place at a time 
Passi had been advising the sultan on finance, was set off by the 
debasement of the coinage with which the soldiers were paid. During the 
bloody revolt, Passi was beaten so badly that he was believed to be dead. In 
1590, the grand vizier abolished the new wine tax against the wishes of 
Jewish tax-farmers Passi supported. 41  Although he made infamous anti-
Jewish statements, Koca Sinan was not anti-Jewish, as he had a Jewish 
physician and adviser himself.42 
In 1590, when the preparations for the fleet to attack Spain began, 
Koca Sinan Paşa asked the sultan not to include Passi in any discussions 
fearing that he may inform Spain. However, the sultan ordered him  
 
to consult with Passi, to listen to him, to favour him. The Grand 
Vizir refused, whereupon the Sultan said that slaves like the Vizir he 
hart [sic] in abundance, but never a one [sic] like David, probably 
alluding to all the information about Christendom with which Passi 
furnishes the Sultan. 
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The grand vizier obeyed the sultan and discussed the fleet preparations with 
Passi. They contended over whether the new fleet would attack Spain as 
Koca Sinan wished or Crete as Passi favoured. Passi’s involvement with the 
Polish affair also displeased Koca Sinan Paşa.43 
If the Spanish were the ultimate enemy for the Ottomans, Koca 
Sinan Paşa was the ideal warmongering grand vizier to avenge the 
embarrassing Ottoman defeat at the battle of Lepanto (1571). Unlike his 
rival Siyavuş Paşa, who would rather negotiate peace with Spain, Koca 
Sinan Paşa had both Sokollu Mehmed Paşa’s (in office 1565-1579) 
mercantile ambitions and thirst for fighting. However, both of them had 
strong Jewish adversaries: Sokollu Mehmed supported Michael 
Cantacuzenus, also known as Şeytanoğlu (the Devil’s son), against the 
interest of the Don Joseph Nasi,44 whereas Koca Sinan opposed David 
Passi and pursued pro-Venetian and anti-Spanish policies. 
Sokollu Mehmed Paşa initiated the rapprochement between England 
and the Ottoman Empire. When the English merchant William Harborne 
travelled to Istanbul in 1578 to obtain trading privileges, Sokollu Mehmed 
Paşa considered it a great opportunity and convinced the sultan to write a 
letter to Elizabeth I. The Habsburg ambassador reflected on Sokollu 
Mehmed’s cunning designs for taking advantage of the religious disunity in 
Europe. He also noted that it was unprecedented for an Ottoman sultan to 
initiate diplomatic correspondence with a European ruler. 45  Post-
Reformation religious disunity in Europe indeed paved the way for the 
Anglo-Ottoman cooperation. Pope Pius V excommunicated Elizabeth I in 
1570, which freed English merchants from the papal levies against trading 
with ‘the infidel’.46  
Koca Sinan and Sokollu Mehmed had other common interests. 
During his first term as grand vizier in the early 1580s, Koca Sinan tried to 
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continue Sokollu Mehmed’s expansionist policies by taking over the 
leadership of the Indian Ocean faction. The grand vizier promoted 
production of knowledge, trade, diplomacy and naval offensives. He took 
up Sokollu Mehmed’s unrealized Suez Canal project, which would arguably 
make the Ottoman power unsurpassable in the Indian Ocean. However, at 
the end of 1582, Koca Sinan’s ambitions were cut short when factionalism 
at court and military problems on the Safavid front led to his dismissal.47  
Koca Sinan seems to have continued Sokollu Mehmed Paşa’s pro-
English policies as well. In 1584, the English agent got involved in the 
disgrace of Siyavuş Paşa with the design of reinstating Koca Sinan to the 
grand vizierate. However, his middle-man Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa, who 
showed the sultan the letters Siyavuş wrote to the rebellious Khan of the 
Crimean Tatars Mehmed Giray, was appointed grand vizier instead of Koca 
Sinan. This shows that Koca Sinan’s pursuit of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance 
preceded his second term in the grand vizierate (1589-1591).48  
 
 
The New Fleet  
 
Koca Sinan Paşa began the preparation for fitting the Ottoman navy with 
new galleys in January 1590, in order to finally realize an Anglo-Ottoman 
offensive against Spain. Venetian reports from January, February and March 
1591 state that David Passi was present at the daily meetings where Koca 
Sinan, the grand admiral, the Chief of the Janissaries Saatçi Hasan 
(promoted to the governor-generalship of Rumelia in January-February 
1591) discussed and oversaw the naval preparations.49 The Ottoman fleet 
intended to help the Huguenot King of Navarre in France and Don 
Antonio onto the throne of Portugal. The English promised the Ottomans 
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Villefranche, Toulon or Marseille.50 However, others did not share Koca 
Sinan’s eagerness to attack Spain. David Passi, the Grand Admirals Uluç 
Hasan Paşa (in office April 1588-July 1591) and Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan 
Paşa (in office July 1591-July 1595) and the Chief of the Janissaries Saatçi 
Hasan made up the pro-Spain or anti-Venetian party. Their aim was to 
attack Crete, at the time a Venetian possession, instead of Spain. Thus they 
saw their interest in another war.51 
Since the Ottoman budget had a deficit in the 1580s and 1590s, the 
Ottomans needed an innovative scheme to raise the funds necessary for the 
preparation of a fleet of 300 vessels.52 In this, the members of the Ottoman 
ruling classes were to finance the fleet. The sultan would pay for fifty 
galleys, the grand vizier for ten, each vizier (there were five or six viziers) 
for six galleys, the chancellor for three vessels and the provincial governors 
would pay together for 146 vessels. In addition to this scheme, the tax 
arrears from the provinces accumulated in the past twenty years were to be 
channelled into the new fleet. Thus, the burden of the vessels on the 
Imperial Treasury would be nominal. To collect the tax arrears, a tax-farm 
was created and auctioned, but nobody wanted to bid on such a risky 
venture. Then it was decided that provincial administrators would collect 
the tax arrears and send them to Istanbul in two instalments. Collecting the 
tax arrears with this method was not a standard Ottoman taxation practice. 
The Venetian ambassador attributed this novel idea to David Passi, while 
the grand vizier claimed it as his own in his précis reports to the sultan.53  
Orders for the materials necessary for building the ships were sent to 
various parts of the empire. Koca Sinan came up with a new canal project 
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that would connect the Lake of Nicaea, the river of Sakarya and the Black 
Sea to bring construction materials and wood to Istanbul with more ease.54 
In January 1591, the sultan wrote to the Queen of England and the King of 
France that he had appointed Koca Sinan Paşa the commander of the fleet 
that was to be sent against Spain in 1592.55 The only piece Selaniki wrote 
about the offensive was the appointment of Koca Sinan as the commander 
of the fleet against the ‘miserable infidels’, meaning Spain. He must have 
seen an order that made the Ottoman campaign against Spain official.56 
 
 
David Passi’s disgrace  
 
Alvaro Mendes represented the Portuguese pretender Don Antonio at 
European courts for a long time before his move to Istanbul. Don Antonio 
was related to Elizabeth I’s physician Rodrigo Lopez and to Alvaro Mendes 
through his New Christian mother and sister. When Alvaro Mendes’ 
relations with Don Antonio became tense, his rival David Passi took up the 
cause of the Portuguese pretender at the Ottoman court. There was also 
friction among the English about what to do with David Passi. The English 
ambassador Edward Barton suggested to Don Antonio that he should sue 
Alvaro Mendes in front of the sultan, claiming that his wealth was 
illegitimately acquired in Portugal and actually belonged to him. However, 
Elizabeth’s Lord High Treasurer William Cecil wrote to Mendes to 
guarantee him English support if such a lawsuit was ever brought before the 
sultan. The queen reprimanded Barton for relying too much on David 
Passi’s advice. Is it possible that the English found out about Passi’s double-
dealing later than the Venetian ambassador?57  
In March 1591, the grand vizier wrote to Don Antonio that the 
sultan decided to protect and help him onto the throne of Portugal in 
alliance with the English. He did demand from Don Antonio that his son 
be sent as a hostage to Istanbul, as the Ottomans had the custom of holding 
the sons of rulers that entered into an alliance with them as subordinates. 
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Koca Sinan assured Don Antonio that David Passi would further inform 
him of everything in greater detail.58 
In spite of the confidence of the sultan, David Passi worked as a 
double agent, if not from the time of his arrival in Istanbul, then at least 
from November 1589 onwards. The Venetian ambassador reported that the 
Spanish agent Giovanni Steffano Ferrari conferred a regular salary on David 
Passi.59 In January 1591 the Venetian ambassador reported home that he, 
too, had to take David Passi into his confidence because of his increasing 
importance, in all likelihood without any trust on his part.60 In February 
1591, the Venetian dispatch stated that David Passi was on the point of 
secretly dispatching Guglielmo di Savoy to Philip II to give him a warning 
on the fleet preparations.61  
Within a month, on March 16, 1591, David Passi fell into disgrace 
with Koca Sinan, the ostensible reason for which was a letter he sent to the 
Grand Chancellor of Poland. The letter stated that the grand vizier ‘wrote 
the letter of accord and reconciliation on his own authority only, without 
binding the Sultan, and this with a view to deceiving… and drawing 
money.’62 In his précis reports Koca Sinan repeatedly explained how David 
Passi thwarted the negotiation of the Polish-Ottoman peace and the arrival 
of the tribute. His reports about the Polish affair suggest that the grand 
vizier was indeed in consultation with the sultan.63 
Koca Sinan Paşa was furious when he found out about the letter 
because he thought it implied treason. Passi’s letter to the Polish chancellor 
must have been the last drop that made Koca Sinan determined to get rid of 
him by all means. He ordered Passi’s immediate imprisonment at midnight, 
but Passi was not at home. When he found out about the order for his 
arrest, David Passi went into hiding at the residence of Saatçi Hasan Paşa, 
the recently appointed Governor-General of Rumelia. The Venetian 
ambassador was uncertain whether Koca Sinan would be able to get David 
Passi banished from the court. The ambassador argued that Passi’s friends 
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and protectors were telling the sultan that Passi was ‘the only truthful and 
well-informed spy against Christian powers’. This group clearly included the 
grand admiral (Uluç Hasan Paşa and his successor Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan 
Paşa) and the Governor-General of Rumelia, Saatçi Hasan Paşa.64  
Koca Sinan Paşa’s first extant report to the sultan about Passi’s 
disgrace included his dialogue with Saatçi Hasan. The governor-general told 
the grand vizier that it would have been better if he had made friends with 
Passi, because he was very rich and he enriched many people. He added 
‘even the sultan listened to his counsel’. Koca Sinan reported that he got 
very angry and rebuked him. He maintained that the sultan would never 
believe the words of a wretched Jew, and quoted Quran 5:51.65 The grand 
vizier summarized the meaning of the passage for the sultan tersely: ‘If you 
make them friends, you become one of them.’ Saatçi Hasan accused the 
grand vizier: ‘It is said that you want to have Passi killed, he cannot go out 
because of his fear.’ Koca Sinan explained that Passi was a dhimmi 
(protected subject) and he would not move a single hair without consulting 
the sultan, let alone murder Passi.66 
 The grand vizier then argued that it was against Islam to make David 
Passi privy to the secrets of the state and that those who befriended Passi or 
expected loyalty (ṣadaḳat) from him could not be true Muslims. He included 
in this group Saatçi Hasan and the chancellor, Abdülmuhyi Çelebi. Koca 
Sinan asserted that Passi’s loyalty probably lay with the Spanish and the 
Venetians. Koca Sinan explained to the sultan how David Passi’s 
involvement with ‘the Polish affair’ prevented the arrival of the tribute that 
was necessary for the payment of the soldiers. Nevertheless, none of these 
arguments could initially convince Murad III to dismiss or exile David 
Passi. Lastly, Koca Sinan stated in his report that he was afraid that the 
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governor-general would slander him in writing. He was foretelling the 
future, a future he may have helped shape more actively than he admitted.67  
On May 18, 1591, events took a turn for the better for David Passi, 
as he obtained in the sultan’s handwriting an order for his immediate 
release. Upon his release, Koca Sinan had the Jewish spy brought to his 
presence and reportedly cried out that he would have him drowned as Passi 
entered the room. However when the grand vizier saw the sultan’s order, he 
was pacified and let him go.68 Nevertheless Koca Sinan Paşa was able to 
turn things around once again. On July 15, 1591, he had David Passi 
publicly chained and exiled. A rumour went that Passi was destined for 
Tunis. The Venetian ambassador claimed that he would be thrown into the 
sea the moment the galley left the harbour.69  
Disgrace was a widespread problem because if court officials, high 
office holders and courtiers carried out illegitimate activities that would get 
them charged with treason. There are numerous examples where we see 
noblemen at European courts or servants of the sultan in Istanbul who fell 
from grace. Dissimulation ties all these stories. While pretending to act in 
total submission and loyalty to their rulers, David Passi and Sir Edward 
Stafford furnished the enemy with sensitive information, Sir Francis 
Walsingham intervened in matters of succession, while the queen’s 
physician Roderigo Lopez got involved in the poison plot of 1593 and was 
executed for high treason.70  
However, not every treacherous act became public. This was not just 
because these acts remained secret. Rulers, their secretaries and grand 
viziers feigned ignorance of the treason of officials and servants until 
changes in the wider political conjuncture necessitated them to let go of 
their favourites. Koca Sinan could have disgraced David Passi before he 
found out about his letter to the Polish. Likewise, Sir Francis Walsingham 
let Sir Edward Stafford get away with spying for Spain. Elizabeth I could 
have known more about the Earl of Leicester’s activities and marital status 
than is generally admitted, while there have been studies on Philip II’s use 
of the art of dissimulation for various political ends. In order to preserve 
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the harmony at court, rulers feigned ignorance of illegitimate activities of 
court members.71 
Heavy punishments were meted out to those charged with treason. 
In England, Edward III’s Treason Act of 1352 had been used throughout 
the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.72 Ottoman sultans could order 
the punishment siyaseten (capital punishment by the will of the ruler) on 
those they found guilty of treason, for the public order or the raison d’état. 
The authority to inflict capital punishment in this manner was held by the 
sultan and his grand vizier. Often there was no trial or investigation when a 
high-ranking member of the political elite committed treason. In cases 
without trial or evidence, the grand vizier and the sultan legitimized capital 
punishment according to shariat. They asked for a legal opinion (fatwa) from 
the chief juristconsult (şeyhülislam) who would charge the accused within the 
shariat category of sā‘ī bi’l-fesād (formenting corruption).73  
The absence of trial and evidence point to the informal nature of 
these disgrace cases, wherin the basis for the decision could well be 
unsubstantiated allegations of a rival. This is typical of disgrace cases of 
members of the military-administrative elite, who were legally considered 
the slaves of the sultan. Exile and confiscation could be milder punishments 
for the treacherous. Non-Muslim advisers and financers of the sultan were 
also treated like his slaves. In 1576, Murad III ordered the execution of 
Michael Cantacuzenus, who was supported by the Grand Vizier Sokollu 
Mehmed Paşa, without trial. The sultan confiscated Cantacuzenus’ property, 
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The libel plot  
 
Sometime in May 1591, a libellous letter signed by an unnamed janissary 
had been planted in the third courtyard of the palace. The sultan sent the 
libellous letter to the grand vizier for inspection. Koca Sinan did not include 
the text of the libel in his report collection, however, we can surmise that 
the author of the libel not only slandered the grand vizier, but also insulted 
the person of the sultan. Koca Sinan wrote that he cried when he read the 
letter and argued that a Muslim could not have written such words. 
Moreover the author of the letter claimed that a janissary uprising was on 
the horizon.75  
The sultan was furious and fearful. Koca Sinan promised the sultan 
to find the author(s) of the libel. Conveniently for the grand vizier, the 
authors he identified were none other than David Passi and the Governor-
General of Rumelia, Saatçi Hasan Paşa. The libellous letter must have been 
planted before the banishment of Saatçi Hasan to Çorlu in April-May 1591. 
We know from Selaniki Mustafa Efendi’s chronicle that Saatçi Hasan was 
dismissed because ‘he wrote with malice a [libellous] paper containing some 
true some false things’ about the grand vizier. The chronicler did not 
explain the contents, or how Saatçi Hasan was identified as the author, or 
Passi’s role.76 
Koca Sinan established the guilt of Saatçi Hasan and David Passi by 
correspondence to Murad III. The grand vizier reported that the steward of 
the governor-general wrote a note to one of his own servants from prison, 
saying that he wanted to give a statement. However before getting his 
testimony, Koca Sinan used the steward’s handwriting as evidence. He 
surmised that the libellous letter and the note of the steward were written by 
the same hand. The grand vizier sent both documents to the sultan for 
examination before he went to get the steward’s statement. The sultan 
approved with a pithy response.77 
 In his next report, Koca Sinan stated that the steward was 
questioned without torture.78 During the interrogation, the steward claimed 
                                                     
75 Sahillioğlu ed., Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri, 54-55. 
76 Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki, 236; Sahillioğlu, Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri, 54-57, 182-
184. 
77 Sahillioğlu ed., Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri, 24; Faroqhi, ‘Ein Günstling’, 293. 
78 ‘asla cefā olunmayub su’āl olunduḳda’ [when he was interrogated without being 
tortured]. See: Sahillioğlu ed., Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri, 182. 




that the governor-general and David Passi often came together at night and 
had papers written in an enclosed room where they brought scribes. He 
added that he did not know what they had written. However, the steward 
explained that some people in janissary and cavalry uniforms would wait 
downstairs and take the letters, which implied that Passi and Saatçi Hasan 
had the libellous letter planted in the palace courtyard. The steward asserted 
that he knew Passi’s scribe and that he should be questioned. When Koca 
Sinan interrogated Passi’s scribe, he too claimed to know nothing, and 
asserted that ‘the Jew is there, you should question him.’ Then, the grand 
vizier questioned Passi without the slightest torment. Koca Sinan Paşa did 
not report to the sultan what Passi said during the interrogation but his 
ruling: ‘in conclusion it was understood to be established that most of the 
[libellous] papers were written through their means’.79 How he reached this 
conclusion remains a mystery.  
When Koca Sinan reported to Murad III the exchange between 
Saatçi Hasan and himself, he did not demand the imprisonment or exile of 
Passi. He just asked the sultan not to trust or employ him.80 In his next 
report, the grand vizier noted that Passi was imprisoned in Yeni Hisar in 
accordance with the sultanic decree. Yet, imprisonment alone did not satisfy 
Koca Sinan. He demonstrated how Passi meddled with the Polish affair and 
argued that Passi should be executed. The sultan ordered him again to 
imprison Passi and not to let him talk to anyone, saying that the time for his 
execution had not come.81 It seems that Passi’s involvement in the Polish 
affair had been more important for the sultan than his espionage for Phillip 
II. Koca Sinan protested to the delay of Passi’s execution and then he asked 
the sultan to order his exile to Rhodes, claiming half the population of 
Istanbul could be brought as witnesses against him and that Imperial Tutor 
Hoca Sadüddin approved it. 82  In another report after Koca Sinan Paşa 
‘proved’ Passi’s guilt in the libel affair, the grand vizier repeated his 
arguments for the importance of executing Passi, and asked the sultan again 
to exile him. The sultan finally ordered Passi’s exile to Rhodes, adding that 
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spilling the dirty blood of the infidel was not necessary.83 Thus Koca Sinan 
Paşa managed to adorn Passi with an iron necklace and exile him to Rhodes. 
Factional politics relied on allegations and gossip transmitted to the 
sultan anonymously at the late sixteenth century Ottoman court. Voluntary 
informers wrote and sent libelous letters (called kaġid or rika) to the sultan 
through doorkeepers and other palace officials, or simply by throwing them 
into the inner courtyard of the palace. The ostensible intention of their 
authors was to inform the sultan about the corruption, embezzlement, 
treason, or oppression of political elites. However, they were often written 
to denigrate foes, or blackmail the sultan by outlining the preparations for 
rebellion among the soldiers anonymously. Gossip and slander also served 
this purpose, though only libel was a vehicle of communicating things one 
would not dare to say to the sultan. Libel was also used in European courts, 
where underground presses made them available for masses. 84  In the 
Ottoman Empire, libel texts were transmitted in private, and even the 




Conspiracy or Conspiracy Theory 
 
The distinction between conspiracy and conspiracy theory is useful for 
thinking about what might have happened. Conspiracies do not always 
benefit those who plan them; sometimes another person can exploit an 
existing conspiracy with a convincing conspiracy theory. The willingness of 
the steward to give testimony and the lack of detail about the interrogations 
suggest the possibility of what the historian Carlo Ginzburg calls ‘false 
conspiracy’. Ginzburg argues that ‘conspiracies exist, and false conspiracies 
always conceal real ones.’ Here, the false conspiracy would be Koca Sinan’s 
claim that David Passi and Saatçi Hasan wrote the libel. The real conspiracy 
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could be that an unrelated third person or someone who was following 
Koca Sinan’s orders wrote the libellous letter that the grand vizier 
successfully attributed to David Passi and Saatçi Hasan.86  
On August 2, 1591, Koca Sinan himself was dismissed and replaced 
with his rival Ferhad Paşa. Ferhad Paşa became the leader of the pro-
Spanish party, against virtually everyone else. At one point, the sultan asked 
him not to broach the subject of peace again. Meanwhile, the new grand 
admiral Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Paşa was going to the arsenal everyday. 
Under the influence of the imperial tutor he, too, became enthusiastic about 
a campaign against Spain. They intrigued for reinstating Koca Sinan with 
the support of Murad III’s consort, Safiye Sultan.87  After nine months, 
Murad III dismissed Ferhad Paşa because of another libel (this time signed 
by the Chief of the Janissaries Mehmed Ağa). 88  The sultan wanted to 
reappoint Koca Sinan and get on with the Spanish campaign. However, he 
was away from the capital, so he appointed Siyavuş Paşa instead, who 
restarted the truce negotiations with Spain once more.89 
 It must be immediately after Koca Sinan’s dismissal that a Jew called 
Arslan wrote a petition to the sultan for the release of his ‘father Frank 
David who had been innocently exiled to Rhodes due to ill will’.90 Within a 
week, on August 9, 1591, the sultan ordered the Governor of Rhodes to set 
David Passi free and send him back to Istanbul.91 The Venetian ambassador 
reported on September 21 that David Passi had returned from Rhodes with 
terror on his face. The ambassador thought that he would better leave the 
affairs of the state alone, ‘if he had any brains at all’.92  
The last appearance of David Passi in Istanbul was in 1593; Judah 
Serfatim (the London agent of Alvaro Mendes) wrote a letter to Rodrigo 
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Lopez, which stated that Passi was in prison.93 Koca Sinan, who had been 
appointed grand vizier for the third time on January 28, 1593, must have 
found a way to eliminate Passi once and for all. However, border skirmishes 
in Hungary became a serious problem, which led Koca Sinan Paşa to lead 
the pro-war party against the Habsburgs of Vienna, which resulted in the 





The domestic and foreign interests Koca Sinan Paşa harboured boiled down 
to a single libel plot. Maybe he just came up with a convincing theory, 
maybe he conspired against Saatçi Hasan and David Passi. It seems 
plausible that the grand vizier resorted to intrigue. After all, his anti-Jewish 
denunciation or foreign policy arguments did not suffice to remove Passi 
and his ally Saatçi Hasan from the court.  
Defeating Spain would have been the Ottoman comeback in the 
Mediterranean. Were the times ripe for this? The Ottoman Empire had 
monetary and fiscal problems, partly due to prolonged warfare in Iran. 
Furthermore, Murad III could not trust any one grand vizier for long. It is 
said that his extreme superstition led him to depend on the imperial 
astrologer, Takiyüddin, and his sheik, Şücaaeddin, more than his temporal 
advisers or his absolute deputy, the grand vizier. In spite of having powerful 
backers at the Ottoman court such as Koca Sinan Paşa and the Imperial 
Tutor Sadeddin Efendi, the Anglo-Ottoman offensive against Spain could 
not be realized. At the height of the fleet preparations in 1591, Murad III 
dismissed Koca Sinan. Like the Ottoman expansion in the Indian Ocean in 
the 1580s, the Anglo-Ottoman offensive against Spain was thwarted by the 
instability of the office of the grand vizier. However, trade and diplomacy 
between the two countries prospered. 
The greatest statesmen pursued their own interests and glory in those 
of their king, queen, sultan or shah. This was clearly the discourse Koca 
Sinan Paşa employed in his reports. However, we also know about his 
commercial endeavours that led him to be extremely wealthy. Koca Sinan 
showed that he was good at conjecturing when the conjuncture was suitable 
for success, laying out the strategy for coordinating enormous projects. 
Maybe Koca Sinan’s weakness was that he blew up these plans to grandiose 
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proportions, each time including a costly canal project, which his rivals used 
to bring about the grand vizier’s dismissal.  
Double agents like David Passi had the courage to set out on 
uncertain paths across the separating lines of religion, language, nation and 
ruler, but not always without a cost. Back in 1573 when Passi became a 
double agent of Venice and Spain, he knew very well that he could face 
treason charges. However those who took the risk of disgrace were not 
limited to double agents. Members of the political elite all dissimulated 
about their personal interests in foreign policy and mercantile issues.  
People leave behind documents: traces of events, transactions, 
friendships, enmities, negotiations, itineraries and plans. Although different 
documents give us different clues about what might have happened, they 
are not portals that transport us to an already inaccessible past reality. 
Whether or not David Passi and Saatçi Hasan conspired, or Koca Sinan 
created a convincing theory to discredit them, will never be known. The 
most plausible approximation is that Koca Sinan was able to manipulate the 
situation with a greater degree of finesse and candour than the multi-sided 
agent and his associate. 
